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a b s t r a c t
S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) is a well-known standard for
secure e-mail exchange. S/MIME builds its identity management on e-mail addresses,
rather than real names. This fact may sometimes cause sending a signed e-mail with
a bogus name on it. Moreover, header information of a signed e-mail message, such as
subject and name, can be altered without affecting the verifiability of the signature. This
paper spots the details of such problems of S/MIME and discusses some solutions from
both developer and user points of view. Moreover, GUI considerations about these prob-
lems are also analyzed in this paper. An ideal GUI is modeled and developed.
ª 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The answer to the question of ‘‘Have you received an unex-
pected e-mail from yourself or from another person that he/
she did not send?’’ would probably be ‘‘yes’’ for a vastmajority
of the e-mail users. Current standards allow almost no default
control on the authenticity of the senders in e-mail messages.
Some SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) servers prohibit
relays and mandate entering username and password even
for sending e-mails, so that only legitimate users can send
e-mails to others. However, it is always possible to run an
independent SMTP server to by-pass authentication controls
enforced by the decent SMTP servers and their administrators.
Bogus e-mail problem is unlikely to be prevented by
restrictive measures, but receivers should be able to detect
bogus messages. Consider the conventional (snail) mail
service. Anybody canwrite any name on a letter and envelope,
andmail it. USPS or another postal service has nothing to do to
identify the sender. The receiver should identify the sender
using the information, especially signature, provided in the
letter. A similar situation exists in the case of e-mail. The
e-mail message should contain kind of a signature so that the
receiver can identify the sender.
Fortunately, cryptographic digital signatures are possible
in e-mails. Digital signatures in e-mails are standardized by
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) as S/MIME (Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions). Signing a message is
a cryptographic operation that requires the private key of
the signer. Since the private key is known only by the signer
and not shared, the output of the signing process is
considered as signature. Verification of a digital signature
requires the corresponding public key. That is why the
signer should make his/her public key accessible by other
people. Distribution of public keys in S/MIME is performed
using digital certificates.
However, S/MIME is not bulletproof. The identity
management issues and some design decisions of S/MIME
cause some practical problems in perception of signature
verification by average users. For example, the name of the
sender could be changed by an attacker and the signature is
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still shown as verified. Moreover, the original subject may
be modified without affecting the verifiability of the signa-
ture. In this paper, we detail these types of problems of S/
MIME. We propose some solutions and develop criteria for
an ideal GUI that carries S/MIME facts to the users in
a proper way.
In Section 2, we give an overview the S/MIME effort of IETF.
S/MIME prefers to use e-mail addresses as identities, not real
names. The reasons of this fact and possible consequences are
summarized in Section 2 as well. Section 3 is about demon-
stration of some practical problems in S/MIME. We also
propose some solutions in the same section. Section 4
discusses GUI considerations about S/MIME; defines an ideal
GUI and compares to some existing e-mail clients. Discussions
and conclusions are given in Section 5.
2. Digital signatures in e-mails
and S/MIME effort
S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) (S/
MIME Working Group, 2008) is designed for incorporation of
cryptographic security techniques in e-mails. Not only digital
signatures, but also encrypted e-mails are possible in S/MIME.
However in this paper, our interest is only in the signature
capability of S/MIME. S/MIME is not a product, but a standard
feature that is to be supported by e-mail client programs, like
MS Outlook, Outlook Express, Eudora, Mozilla Thunderbird
and Netscape Messenger.
S/MIME defines the structure of digital signature blocks to
be appended to e-mail messages. A signature block is gener-
ated by applying the cryptographic signature generation
function over the message. This process uses sender’s private
key. Upon reception, the recipient verifies the signature using
the pubic key of the sender. At this point receiver has an
important limitation. The receiver should make sure that the
public key used for verification really belongs to the sender;
otherwise receiver cannot comment on the identity of the
sender. S/MIME proposes using digital certificates (ITU-T, 2000;
Levi, 2006) for this problem.
2.1. Digital certificates
Digital certificates (a.k.a. digital identities) are widely used
as an enabling mechanism for public key cryptosystem
based applications. The certificates used for S/MIME are
approved bindings between the identity of the certificate
holders and their public keys. Certificates are issued by
trusted Certification Authorities (CAs) with their digital
signature over the certificate content. Prior to verification of
the signature over the e-mail message, the recipient verifies
the signature over the sender’s certificate to find out his/
her public key. In this way, the recipient makes sure about
the identity of the person of whom he/she is using public
key for signature verification.
Generally a chain of certificates is verified starting with
a trusted root-CA, for whom the recipient knows the
public key. Public keys (actually self-signed certificates) of
well-known root-CAs come with S/MIME enabled e-mail
clients.
2.2. How S/MIME works for digitally signed messages?
Once the message content is ready, the sender generates his/
her digital signature over the content and appends it to the
message. Sender generally sends his/her certificate alongwith
the signed message.
The recipient processes the certificate and signed message
separately. First the certificate is verified as described in
Section 2.1. The public key obtained from certificate verifica-
tion is used to verify the signature over the e-mail. Moreover,
the e-mail address in the certificate is compared to the one in
the e-mail message; they must be equal.
Fig. 1 shows the life cycle of a signed message sent from
Alice to Bob. If all verifications and controls at the recipient
(Bob) are all right, then the e-mail client shows an indicator for
a successfully signed and verified message.
2.3. Standardization efforts related to S/MIME
Standardization is a must for proper interoperability among
different e-mail (SMTP) servers, clients and CAs. S/MIME is an
effort of IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), S/MIME Mail
Security working group (S/MIME WG). The WG has proposed
several standards track, informational and experimental RFCs
and Internet Drafts that can be reached from theWG’swebsite
(S/MIME Working Group, 2008).
S/MIME also relies on some other standards and RFCs. For
cryptographic processing, PKCS (Public Key Cryptography Stan-
dards) (RSA Laboratories, 2008) are referred in several S/MIME
documents. S/MIMEcertificatesarebasedonPKIX(InternetX.509
Public Key Infrastructure) initiative (PKIXWorking Group, 2008),
and consequently on X.509 standard (ITU-T, 2000).
Regarding basic mail services, S/MIME depends on RFC
2821 (SMTP specification) (Klensin, 2001), RFC 2822 (Message
Format Specification) (Resnick, 2001). MIME specifications
(Freed and Borenstein, 1996a; Freed and Borenstein, 1996b;
Moore, 1996; Freed and Klensin, 2005; Freed and Borenstein,
1996c) have strong relationships with S/MIME as well.
In this paper, we mostly refer to RFC 2632 (S/MIME Version
3 Certificate Handling) (Ramsdell, 1999a) and RFC 2633
(Ramsdell, 1999b) (S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification).
S/MIME Version 3.1 of both RFCs is also published as RFC 3850
(Ramsdell, 2004a) and RFC 3851 (Ramsdell, 2004b), respec-
tively. Version 3.1 obsoletes previous version. However, since
all of the S/MIME implementations that we are aware of still
bear version 3.0 features for digital signature processing,
version 3.0 is more relevant than version 3.1 in this paper.
2.4. Identity management in S/MIME: principles
and problems
S/MIME consistently abstained from using real names as
primary identity elements in e-mail signature verification.
Instead, it uses e-mail addresses for this purpose. Possible
reasons include:
(i) Impossibility of having a globally unique name, thus
possible naming ambiguities (for example, theremight be
two John Smiths in the same country’s, same organ-
ization’s, same organizational unit),
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(ii) hardness of obtaining a standard name out of complex
certificate fields, and
(iii) unbearable attraction of globally unique and application-
specific e-mail addresses.
Unfortunately, this design decision triggered two impor-
tant problems:
1) The name information in the certificate and the name in
the e-mail message become independent of each other, so
name information in an S/MIME certificate looses its
importance in e-mail signature verification.
2) Recipients are enforced to identify people using their e-mail
addresses. This may not be the common practice. People
tend to identify other people using their real names. Some
e-mail clients show only the names in the message
windows and/or preview panels.
These problems, together with some flaws in certification
practices and the scope of signature in e-mailmessages, cause
some practical attacks on S/MIME signature scheme. Theywill
be described in Section 3.
3. Practical problems of S/MIME
S/MIME provides strong security services to e-mail messages.
However, there are still some practical security problems
especially in identity management, certificate handling and
header protection. In this section, we explain those problems
that exist in S/MIME Version 3, and discuss some solutions
and S/MIME WG efforts to solve them in Version 3.1.
We discuss three courses of problems and attacks on
S/MIME.
1. Bogus identity usage in class-1 certificates
2. Using a name different than the one in the certificate
3. Header protection issues
3.1. Bogus identity in class-1 certificates
CAs perform identity control prior to issuance of a certificate.
Although it is not a standard rule, Stallings (2006) discusses
three different levels (classes) of identity controls. Here we
give a brief overview of these certificate classes that might
slightly differ from CA to CA in practice.
, Class-1: Class-1 certificate issuance is an on-line process.
Name of the subject entity is not validated. Only an e-mail
address control is performed by sending an authentication
string to the e-mail address that the subject entity provides
in certificate application. In order to complete the certificate
issuance process, the subject entity should use this
authentication string. This e-mail address appears in the
certificate. Some CAs include the name of the subject entity
in the certificate as well, but specifying that the name is not
validated. However, the appropriate action would be not to
includeaname ina class-1 certificate, as someotherCAsdo.
, Class-2: The certification processmay ormay not be on-line
depending on the CA’s practice. Subject entity information
(such as name and address) is checked against a third party
database. Some CAs may ask the subject entity to send
a hardcopy signed agreement and/or a hardcopy identity
document via facsimile or snail mail. However, personal
presence is not required. E-mail address control as in the
class-1 certificates is also performed.
, Class-3: In addition to the e-mail address control, the
subject entity should personally present an identity docu-
ment to a registration authority. The process is off-line and
may take some time to be completed.
Class-1 certificates provide lowest degree of identity
assurance, but they are the easiest to issue and cheapest. Thus
they become very popular among the certificate holders.
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Fig. 1 – Life cycle of a signed message.
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The level of assurance given in a certificate is more of
a concern of the peer entity, who will verify the certificate,
than of the certificate holder. Therefore, certificate holders
usually do not care the lack of identity control in class-1
certificates. Root certificates for all certificate classes come
with the client software, so practically all certificates are
verifiable and there is no striking difference among them from
the point of view of an average recipient. Moreover, using
a class-3 certificate does not make the certificate owner cryp-
tographically more secure; all classes of certificates use the
same signature algorithms and are capable of certifying public
keys of the same cryptographic strength.
As mentioned above, class-1 certificates do not contain
validated names. Indeed, it is possible to obtain a class-1
certificate from a respectable CA with a bogus name on it.
Moreover, the e-mail client programs allow using any name
while sending an e-mail message. These two facts enable
sending an S/MIME signed message with a bogus name. The
e-mail clients thatweconsidered (namelyNetscapeMessenger
7.2, MSOutlook XP and 2007,Mozilla Thunderbird 1.5.0.10, and
MS Outlook Express 6) verify this signature successfully and
present the signed message as if sent by the bogus name. The
S/MIME specifications do not enforce the e-mail client
programs to show the signature verification information in
a standard way. That is why each client has different GUI to
display an e-mail message and the corresponding signature
information. We comparatively analyze the GUIs of different
e-mail client programs inChapter 4.Here,wegive twoexample
GUIs that belong to MS Outlook Express 6 and Mozilla Thun-
derbird in Fig. 2; the GUIs say that John Doe has signed the
message, which is, of course, not the case.
In this example case, the certificate we obtained includes
a bogus name in it. However,most CAs do not include names in
class-1 certificates, since they do not assure identity. Our attack
is still possible with such class-1 certificates. S/MIME does not
enforce anameexistence check in certificate verificationphase.
Fig. 2 – A digitally signed message with a bogus name. (a) as shown by MS Outlook Express, (b) as shown by Mozilla
Thunderbird.
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Therefore, it is possible to use any name while sending signed
messages, even if the certificate contains no name in it.
Since the S/MIME clients perform a match between the
e-mail address in the certificate and the e-mail address in the
e-mail header, the sender must use the e-mail address within
the certificate. This address would definitely be different than
the actual address of the person whose identity is being
stolen. This may lead the recipient to figure out that there is
something wrong, if the recipient identifies e-mail senders by
their e-mail addresses rather than their names. However,
people generally use real names for identification.
The policy identifiers that point to the CPS (Certificate
Practice Statement) of the CA may be another hint for the
recipient to understand the limitations of class-1 certificates.
However, such a CPS control may require a long reading, and
sometimes expertise in security technology for comprehen-
sion. Another action that the recipient may take is to check
the certificate details by clicking on some buttons. CAs mostly
put a remark in the certificate to mention that the person is
not validated. However, a user with average technical infor-
mation about security cannot easily comprehend the details
of a certificate, especially when his/her popular e-mail client
program says ‘‘the message has been signed and verified’’,
and shows the sender’s name in the message header. Indeed,
there are some studies in the literature that put forward the
problems of understanding and using the security function-
ality that exists in end-user programs. Whitten and Tygar
(1999) analyzed PGP and found a number of user interface
design flaws that may contribute to security failures. Furnell
et al. (2006) has recently carried out a survey study and
concluded that more than half of the MS Outlook Express
users show important deficiencies in comprehending suffi-
cient information about e-mail encryption and digital signa-
tures. Another recent work by Furnell (2005) highlights
problems of users in terms of finding, understanding, and
ultimately using the security features that are meant to be at
their disposal. As these studies showed, the user interface
with which the security features are presented to the users is
very important for an average user to protect himself/herself.
Users should be educated to be more conscious about the
limitations of class-1 certificates in order not to make the
e-mail service more insecure in the name of security. Thus, in
order to protect the users from the bogus names in class-1
certificates, the e-mail clients may take an automated action
Fig. 3 – A digitally signed message that uses a name different than the one in the certificate.
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to identify class-1 certificates and warn the recipient with
a proper GUI message, although it is not mandated by the
S/MIME standards. Such a GUI based solution is proposed and
implemented in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
More radical solutions could be (a) discontinuation of class-1
certificate issuances by CAs and/or (b) stopping class-1 root-CA
certificate distribution with e-mail client programs, so that the
recipients are enforced to make a trust decision on those
certificates. We frankly do not believe that these solutions are
applicable in themarket conditions,mainly due to two reasons:
1) it is contrary to the win-win deal between the CAs and the
e-mail client developers, 2) such an action would make the
certificate penetration among the Internet users worse.
3.2. Using a name different than the one in
the certificate
The only connection between a certificate and an e-mail
message is the e-mail address. S/MIME Version 3.0 verification
processmandates having the same e-mail address both in the
sender certificate and in the e-mail message header. However,
S/MIME Version 3.0 does not mandate a comparison between
the name in the certificate and the name in the e-mail
according to RFC 2632, Section 3 (Ramsdell, 1999a). S/MIME
Version 3.1 (RFC 3850) has the same verification process as
well. This verification process enables the sender to be able to
send a signed e-mail message using an e-mail address that
exists in a certificate, but with a different name. Of course the
certificate fields will not change, but the e-mail is verified as if
it is from another person. An example is shown in Fig. 3, upper
left snapshot. The certificate used in this example is the same
as the one used for the example given in Fig. 2. As can be seen
from the ‘‘from’’ field, the sender name is different and this is
not the name that appears in the certificate; but the signature
is still verified.
Moreover, this particular problem is not a problem of only
class-1 certificates, but also of class-2 and class-3 certificates
as well. The problem is in e-mail signature verification
process. This process is independent of the certificate classes
and the level of identity assurance in certificates. As long as
the names are not compared during verification, no matter
how strong identity assurance is provided in certificate
Fig. 4 – a. Original signed message and its source. b. Altered message.
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issuance, this assurance will not be able to be relayed to
signature verification.
The recipient can understand the existence of the problem
by checking the sender’s e-mail address, which is the original
certificate holder’s e-mail address (Fig. 3, upper right snap-
shot), or by examining the certificate details, which show the
name and information of the original certificate holder.
Fortunately, S/MIME Version 3.1 (RFC 3850) (Ramsdell, 2004a)
recommends to display the name and other certificate details
when displaying an indication of successful or unsuccessful
signature verification. We have tested some S/MIME
compliant e-mail client programs to assess how they relay
name and other certificate details to the end users. The details
of this analysis will be given in Section 4.2 and 4.3, but here we
give a brief overview and an example. These tests show that
the e-mail clients relay the name information either on some
late windows that appear after clicking on three or four
buttons, or in a confusing way. An example case is depicted in
Fig. 3 for MS Outlook Express 6. As shown in this figure, the
name in the certificate is shown after three clicks. Similar user
interface considerations for other e-mail client systems will
be detailed later in Section 4.
Actually, as discussed in the previous section, it is not
a good idea to rely on recipient’s off-line checks on the names
or any other certificate field to assure about the validity of
a signature. Users’ expectation from a secure e-mail client
software is automated detection of an anomaly. However,
none of the e-mail clients perform the name consistency
check since it is not part of the S/MIME standard.
3.3. E-mail header alteration
Basically speaking, an e-mail message consists of two parts:
‘‘header’’ and ‘‘content’’ (content is named as the ‘‘MIME
entities’’ in S/MIME documentations). Header contains the
envelope information, like from, to, cc, date, subject, etc.
Content does not contain the header. RFC 2633, Section 3.1
(Ramsdell, 1999b) clearly states that S/MIME Version 3 is to be
used to secure the content, not the header. This fact causes
any malicious alterations on the e-mail header to go unde-
tected. A practical attack could be the alteration of the subject
field of a message by the recipient. For example, consider an
investorA sends a signedmessage to his broker B to buy X Inc.
stocks in the subject field and leaves the message body blank.
B mistakenly buys Y stocks instead of X. In order to compen-
sate this mistake, B can update the message source such that
the subject of the message from A now orders Y Inc. stocks.
The altered message is still digitally signed and verified.
In another scenario, an attacker could modify the subject
field while the message is en route. Such a scenario is shown
in Fig. 4a and b. Fig. 4a shows the original message and its
source. Fig. 4b shows the altered message and source.
Besides the subject field, other header fields, such as to, from,
cc, date, can all be altered without affecting the verifiability of
the existing signature over the message content. The only
exception is the e-mail address (but not the name) of the from
field. If this address is altered, the signature becomes non-
verifiable because of S/MIME’s e-mail address crosscheck.
A precaution against header alteration is not to rely on the
e-mail header information, which is nothing but an envelope
that can be altered. The sender should put all sensitive
information, including his/her name, affiliation, address, and
the recipients’ information, subject, date, etc., into the
message body.
S/MIME Version 3.1 (RFC 3851 (Ramsdell, 2004b)) provides
an optional header protection to some extent, but this
protection has some practical problems as discussed below.
The method proposed by RFC 3851 (Ramsdell, 2004b) is to
encapsulate the actual message into a single MIME object of
message/rfc822 type as an attachment and to apply the
S/MIME signature to this object. This signed message/rfc822
MIME object is to be attached to another e-mail message that
will be sent to the recipient. In this method, the header fields
of the actual message would be in the scope of the digital
signature. However, the header of the outer message that
carries the actualmessage in its attachment is not in the scope
of S/MIME protection. Thus, in order the protection of the
actual (encapsulated) message to be conveyed to the verifying
e-mail recipient, the encapsulated message should be shown
as the only message. Although, RFC 3851 recommends the
e-mail clients to show the encapsulated message as the outer
(and therefore only) message to the recipient, this does not
comply with current e-mail related IETF standards and e-mail
client implementations. Existing standard message/rfc822
processing at the recipient side is to show the encapsulated
message as an attachment and show the header of the outer
Table 1 – Analysis of GUI criteria for the scope of signature.
Clear statement
about the signature
scope (verification)
Clear statement about
the signature scope
(signing)
No verification
message/icon at
the header display
No verification icon
at the preview pane
Ideal GUI Exists on the
e-mail display window
Exists No icon/No message No icon
Netscape Messenger 7.2 Does not exist Does not exist Icon exists/No message No icon
Mozilla
Thunderbird 1.5.0.10
Does not exist Does not exist Icon exists/No message No icon
MS Outlook Express 6 Does not exist Does not exist Icon exists/Message exists Icon exists
MS Outlook XP Does not exist Does not exist No icon/No message Icon exists
MS Outlook 2007 Does not exist Does not exist Icon exists/Message exists Icon exists
Eudora 7.1
(with S/MIME plugin)
Does not exist Does not exist No icon/No message No icon
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message as the main header. Furthermore, the headers of the
outer and the encapsulatedmessages ofmessage/RFC822 type
may be different from each other. This difference is natural
since the aim of message/rfc822 attachment is to forward an
e-mail message; forwarded message may have different
envelope information and subject. Moreover, header protec-
tion of S/MIME Version 3.1 is not a mandatory feature and
actions to be taken in case of an inconsistency between the
protected header fields and ordinary outer header fields are up
to the e-mail client system at the recipient. Thus, for the sake
of compatibility with S/MIME Version 3.0 and regular MIME
conventions, e-mail client developers would prefer to show
the message/rfc822 attachments just as a regular attachment
and would not issue an error for header inconsistencies, if
they implement such a header protection. In this way, the
outer header and the subject that are shown in the e-mail
window would still suffer the abovementioned header alter-
ation attack. Actually, probably due to these practical prob-
lems mentioned here, none of the e-mail clients that we
examined (including recently released MS Outlook 2007 and
recent version of Mozilla Thunderbird) support header
protection of S/MIMEVersion 3.1 in both sending and verifying
S/MIME messages.
4. User interface considerations
The precautions discussed for the problems given in Section 3
are partially human-computer interface (HCI) related. As dis-
cussed in (Johnston et al., 2003) the interface of a system is
important and cannot be neglected, particularly in a security
environment. Thus redesigning of the e-mail clients’ user
Fig. 5 – E-mail window of Eudora; signature verification message is at the beginning of body.
Fig. 6 – E-mail window of MS Outlook XP; signature verification message and the icon are separated from header.
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interface to capture the attendance of the users in case of
security problem would improve the overall security of the
system. In this section, we first outline the GUI criteria that
address the problems identified in Section 3. Then, we analyze
how the current e-mail clients meet these criteria and define
an ideal GUI. During our analyses, we considered six different
e-mail client programs that support S/MIME. These are
namely MS Outlook Express, MS Outlook XP, MS Outlook 2007,
Netscape Messenger 7.2, Mozilla Thunderbird 1.5.0.10, and
Eudora 7.1 with S/MIME plugin. The characteristics that meet
the criteria are shown in italic in the analysis tables. The
analysis tables also show the characteristics of an ideal GUI.
Moreover, the ideal GUI is developed as an extension to
Mozilla Thunderbird.
The criteria that we considered are grouped under three
categories:
- The scope of S/MIME signature
- The e-mail address control at verification
- Relaying the certificate information to the verifier
4.1. GUI criteria for the scope of signature
Asmentioned in Section 3.3, the scope of an S/MIME signature
is the body of the message, not the headers. The GUI should
reflect this fact in both verification and signing.
Clear statement about the signature scope (verification): The
basicway to convey the scope of S/MIME signature verification
Fig. 7 – E-mail window of MS Outlook 2007; signature verification message and the icon are at the end of the header, but not
separated from header.
Table 2 – Analysis of GUI criteria for the e-mail address control at verification (part 1).
Message about e-mail address verification Relaying name information stored in certificate
Place and reachability Form of presentation Place and reachability Form of presentation
Ideal GUI 0-click on the e-mail window;
separated from header.
Bound to the signature or
signer.
1-click in separate dialog box. Not bound to the signature or
signer
Netscape Messenger 7.2 1-click in separate dialog
box
Bound to the signature/signer 1-click in separate dialog box. Bound to the signature/
signer
Mozilla
Thunderbird 1.5.0.10
1-click in separate dialog
box
Bound to the signature/signer 1-click in separate dialog box. Bound to the signature/
signer
MS Outlook Express 6 0-click (part of the header)
and 1-click in separate
dialog box
0-click message does not
have the e-mail address.
1-click message is bound
to the signature/signer
3-click in separate dialog
box
Not bound to the signature or
signer
MS Outlook XP 0-click, separated from header
(and also 1-click in separate
dialog box)
Bound to the signature/signer 3-click in separate dialog
box
Not bound to the signature or
signer
MS Outlook 2007 0-click, but at header; 1-click
in separate dialog box
Bound to the signature/signer 4-click in separate dialog
box
Not bound to the signature or
signer
Eudora 7.1
(with S/MIME plugin)
Message on the e-mail window only says that the e-mail is
signed but does not say who signed it.
Name information of certificate is not accessible
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 0 5 – 1 2 0 113
Author's personal copy
is having a clear statement that specifies that the signature
does not verify the header, but verifies only the body of the
message. This message should appear in the window that
e-mail is shown to the verifier.
Clear statement about the signature scope (signing): Not only
the verifier, but also the signer should be informed about the
scope of S/MIME digital signature while signing. Thus, when-
ever the signer selects the option to digitally sign a message,
there should be a clear message that mentions that the scope
of the signature does not contain the header. Preferably, the
signer should be advised to include its name and other
information needed to be signed in the body of the message.
Other precautions at the verification phase that may
reduce the possibility of misunderstanding that the header is
protected are the followings:
No verification message/icon at the header display: The icon or
the message of verification should not appear on the header
part of the e-mail window, because having such a verification
indication at the header part makes the users to think that
verification starts from that point. The best part to put
a signature verification message and/or an icon is the begin-
ning of the message body or between message body and the
header.
No verification icon at the preview pane: There should not be
an icon which shows that the message is signed in the
message list part of the preview pane. The reason is that in
this list only the header information is shown. Since the
header is not protected, seeing a signature indication there
may mislead the users.
As shown in Table 1, none of the-mail clients that we
examined have a statement about the scope of S/MIME
signature in both signing and verification. Regarding the
precautions, Eudora has the best precaution since it does not
have an icon ormessage at both header and the preview pane.
As shown in Fig. 5, Eudora has a verification message in the
message body, just before the actual message. In Outlook XP,
the verification message and the icon are between the
message and the header, and separated from the header with
a line (Fig. 6). Outlook 2007 also has a similar icon andmessage
at the end of the header part, but unlike Outlook XP, they look
like parts of the header (Fig. 7). Netscape and Thunderbird, as
shown in Fig. 2b, only have an icon of pen shape. Among these
e-mail clients, the worst (i.e. the most misleading) header is
the one of Outlook Express, since both icon and message
mislead user as shown in Fig. 2a.
4.2. GUI criteria for the e-mail address
control at verification
As mentioned in Section 2.2 and several parts of Section 3,
S/MIME standards enforce the verifying software to cross-
check the e-mail address on the certificate and the one in the
e-mail headers. The GUI should contain several issues related
with this control.
Message about e-mail address verification: The fact that
the verification process only checks the e-mail address of the
sender as the identity should be visualized by the verifier. The
best way of doing this is to have a text message which says
that the message was signed by the sender’s e-mail address.
In other words, this message should bind the signature or the
signer to the e-mail address. This message should appear on
the e-mail window so that the verifier should not click on
Fig. 8 – 1-click window of Outlook XP that shows the
signer’s e-mail address.
Fig. 9 – The window of Outlook XP that shows the name on
the certificate.
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something to view this information.We characterize this type
of reachability as ‘‘0-click’’ (in general, we define ‘‘n-click
reachability’’ where n is the number of clicks needed to get
that window). Since conceptually the signature does not cover
header, the GUI should also reflect this fact by separating this
message from the header.
Relaying name information stored in certificate: In the message
described in previous criterion, the sender’s name must be
deliberately hidden from the verifier since the standard
S/MIME verification process does not verify the name. On the
other hand, if the name information is included in the signer’s
certificate, this certificate field should be relayed to the user.
This is becauseof the fact that someattacks are basedonname
spoofing as explained in Section 3.2 and visualization of this
certificate fieldwouldwarn the user about the attack. The ideal
place to show the name field of certificate is on a separate
windowordialogbox that canbe reachableat 1-click.However,
the phrase should never bind the name to the signature;
instead name should be cited as a certificate field only.
Warning about e-mail address inconsistency: In case of an
inconsistency between the e-mail address in the signer
certificate and the e-mail address at the message header
(‘‘from’’ header), the verifying user must be warned. This
warning may be a text message or an icon that reflects the
situation.
Name information in the header: The ‘‘from’’ part of the e-mail
headers may contain both name and e-mail address of the
sender. Some e-mail clients may show both name and the
address on the header part of the message window. However,
some others may show only the name. Having only name
information in the header part of the e-mail window may
cause the verifier to wrongfully think that message is signed
by that person independent of the e-mail address. As
mentioned before, name control is not performed during the
S/MIME signature verification. Therefore, showing only the
name in the header is misleading; the e-mail clients should
show only e-mail address or both address and the name
together.
Name information in the preview pane: Due to the reasons
explained in the previous paragraph, the name information
should not be the only sender information to be shown on the
preview pane aswell. Instead the preview pane should display
Fig. 10 – 1-click window of Thunderbird that shows the signer’s e-mail address and name.
Table 3 – Analysis of GUI criteria for the e-mail address control at verification (part 2).
Warning about e-mail address
inconsistency
Name information in
the header
Name information in
the preview pane
Ideal GUI Warning is issued as an icon and/or text Only e-mail address OR
nameþ e-mail address
Only e-mail address OR
nameþ e-mail address
Netscape Messenger 7.2 Warning is issued as a special icon (a pen with
a question mark). Detailed explanation is available
upon click on the icon
Nameþ e-mail address Only name
Mozilla Thunderbird 1.5.0.10 Warning is issued as a special icon. Detailed
explanation is available upon click on the icon
Nameþ e-mail address Only name
MS Outlook Express 6 Warning is issued as a special icon and an explanation.
No click is needed to see the explanation.
Only name Only name
MS Outlook XP No warning is issued Nameþ e-mail address Only name
MS Outlook 2007 No warning is issued Nameþ e-mail address Only name
Eudora 7.1 (with S/MIME plugin) Warning is issued as a message. No icon exists. Nameþ e-mail address Only name
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 8 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 1 0 5 – 1 2 0 115
Author's personal copy
either the e-mail address of the sender or both address and
name together.
S/MIME signature verification actually covers various
controls, such as certificate validation, content alteration, etc.,
in addition to e-mail address crosscheck. The GUI require-
ments for all controls are not discussed in this paper for the
sake of brevity and since these controls are not directly related
to the attacks covered in Section 3.
The analysis for the first two criteria is given in Table 2. As
can be seen there, none of the e-mail clients that we analyzed
meet all the criteria. However, except Eudora that fails in all
aspects, other clients can be improved easily. All clients,
except Outlook XP, either display the e-mail verification
message at 1-click or at 0-click but at header. This message
should be displayed at 0-click separated from header; this is
doable. As a good example, the e-mail window of MS Outlook
XP is showed in Fig. 6. Outlook 2007 e-mail window is similar
to Outlook XP (Fig. 7), but the message looks like part of the
header. Moreover, Outlook products are successful in showing
the e-mail address properly (i.e. bound to the signature and/or
signer) in 1-click windows. For example, 1-click window of
Outlook XP is shown in Fig. 8. All Outlook products show the
name information with a proper GUI (e.g. for MS Outlook XP,
see Fig. 9) and message but they are displayed a bit late; they
should move the window at which they show the name to
1-click. Finally, Netscape and Thunderbird should improve
their GUIs by unbinding the name information from the
signature and signer. The 1-click window of Thunderbird is
given in Fig. 10. As can be seen from this figure, the e-mail
address message meets the criteria, but the name message
does not since it is bound to the signer/signature.
The analysis for the last three criteria is given in Table 3.
Althoughmost clients (except Outlook Express) contain e-mail
addresses in the header, none of the clients do so in the
preview pane. The preview pane of Thunderbird is given in
Fig. 11 as an example.
Except the Outlook family (XP and 2007), all clients perform
e-mail address crosscheck and relay this control to the veri-
fiers as icons and/or messages. No crosscheck is performed
and signature is considered as verified in MS Outlook 2007 and
XP even if the e-mail address in the message header and the
e-mail address in the certificate are different. Although this
seems against S/MIME standard requirements, the verification
message and the e-mail header show the e-mail address
differences as shown in Fig. 12 (for Outlook 2007). However,
the verifying user must examine the GUI and realize this
problem on his/her own; this may not be easy for an average
user.
4.3. GUI criteria about relaying the certificate
information to the verifier
The S/MIME verifying software should first verify the signer
certificate as mentioned in Section 2.2. However, the only
verified binding between certificate and the message is the e-
mail address of the sender. The criteria related with relaying
this fact to the verifier has been detailed in the previous
section. Moreover, the criteria related with relaying the name
field of the certificate to the verifier are also discussed there.
On the other hand, without properly showing the content of
the signer’s certificate to the verifier, the verification process
cannot be fully comprehended by the verifier, but the
Fig. 11 – Partial preview pane of Thunderbird; only sender’s name, not the e-mail address, is listed.
Fig. 12 – Outlook 2007 GUI shows differences in e-mail addresses even if the signature is shown as verified.
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visualization of information in the certificate and the visual-
ization of the verification results should be separated. The
reason is that by verifying the signer’s certificate during the
verification process, the verifying system verifies only the CA
signature on the certificate; the reliability of the information
contained in the certificate depends on the CPS of the CA that
must be assessed by the verifying user. The GUI consider-
ations about relaying the certificate information to the verifier
are discussed below.
CA certification practice: Displaying a brief summary of the
CA certification practice would be a good idea to inform
average users about the ID verification mechanism employed
by the CA. In this way, the limitations of the class-1 certifi-
cates could be explained to the verifiers.
Link to CPS: Advanced and interested verifiers may need to
read the CPS of the CA in order to learn more about the CA’s
certification practice. Such a link should be accessible via
a few links from the message window.
Full certificate details: Again for interested and advanced
users, all fields of the signer’s certificate could be shown.
However, in order not to confuse the average users, such
a detailed visualization should not be directly reachable from
the message window; instead 2 or 3 clicks should have been
done to reach the full certificate details.
As shown in Table 4, Eudora does not display any certifi-
cate information. Thus it directly fails these criteria. More-
over, none of the clients that we tested display a brief
summary of CA’s certification practice. Netscape and Thun-
derbird do not contain a link to CPS. Outlook family products
display necessary certificate information and have a link to
CPS; however, they mostly are displayed a bit late so that the
user should make several clicks to reach this information.
4.4. Ideal GUI
We develop an add-on to Mozilla Thunderbird for the ideal
GUI described in the previous sections. As shown in Fig. 13,
a clear statement about the scope of signature is added to the
signing operation. Moreover, another message about the
scope of digital signature verification is added to 0-click
message window. As shown in Fig. 14, this message binds the
signature and the signer to the e-mail address, which is
a requirement from ideal GUI as mentioned in Section 4.2.
Furthermore, this message and the corresponding icon have
been separated from the header asmentioned in Section 4.1 as
another ideal GUI requirement. This add-on can be down-
loaded from http://people.sabanciuniv.edu/levi/SMIME-GUI-
addon/.
Table 4 – Analysis of GUI criteria about relaying the certificate information to the verifier.
CA certification practice Link to CPS Full certificate details
Ideal GUI Brief summary Accessible in 1–3 clicks Accessible in 2–3 clicks
Netscape Messenger 7.2 Does not exist No link 2-click
Mozilla Thunderbird 1.5.0.10 Does not exist No link 2-click
MS Outlook Express 6 Does not exist 4-click 4-click
MS Outlook XP Does not exist 4-click 3-click
MS Outlook 2007 Does not exist 5-click 4-click
Eudora 7.1 (with S/MIME plugin) Does not exist No link Does not exist
Fig. 13 – Ideal GUI: Message about the scope of the digital signature while signing.
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The 1-click window of the ideal GUI that appears upon
pressing the verification icon is shown in Fig. 15. This window
is, actually, the modified version of Fig. 10 according to the
ideal GUI criteria given in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. In themessages
of this window, signature is bound to the e-mail address, but
the name on the certificate is relayed to the verifier without
binding to the signature as mentioned in Section 4.2 as an
ideal GUI requirement. Moreover, a brief summary for the CA
certification practice and a link to CPS is added to this window
in accordance with the ideal GUI requirements specified in
Section 4.3.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, ideal GUI should include
awarning in case of inconsistency between the e-mail address
in the ‘‘from’’ message header and the e-mail address in the
certificate. Fig. 16 shows the warning of the 0-click message
window. Fig. 17 shows 1-click window at which a detailed
message and the inconsistent e-mail addresses are shown.
Another ideal GUI requirement is that the preview pane
should display either the e-mail address of the sender or both
address and name together. We have developed our Thun-
derbird add-on such that the user can optionally display only
e-mail address (Fig. 18a) or e-mail address and name together
(Fig. 18b) in the preview pane.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the GUI that was
proposed in this section, we conduct a survey among 115
sophomore year university students who are ordinary
computer users. In this survey, we used two screenshots
similar to Fig. 14 and Fig. 16 and evaluate the user perception
about (a) the entity who signed the message for class 1
certificate case, (b) the scope of signature, and (c) the inter-
pretation of the error message shown in Fig. 16. We reach the
following results by this survey. 68% of the respondents are
aware that a signed message is signed and sent by the user
that holds the account of the email address shown in header,
but the identity is not guaranteed by the signature. 81% of the
respondents are aware that the scope of signature does not
include subject and date, but includes message body. 66% of
the respondents correctly comprehend the erroneous case
shown in Fig. 16 such that it implies themessage is signed, but
the signer is not known.
5. Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we identified some problems of the S/MIME
standard for digital signatures in e-mails. We proposed some
solutions and an ideal GUI for the best comprehension of S/
MIME signatures. We also comparatively analyzed some
existing e-mail clients to evaluate their GUIs.
S/MIME effort is to add cryptographic security in e-mails
using PKIX public key certificates. S/MIME uses e-mail
addresses for identification, while certificates use both names
Fig. 14 – Ideal GUI: Message about the scope of the digital signature verification.
Fig 15 – Ideal GUI: 1-click window of successful verification.
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Fig. 16 – Ideal GUI: Message displayed in case of e-mail address inconsistency during verification.
Fig. 17 – Ideal GUI: 1-click window in case of e-mail address inconsistency during verification.
Fig. 18 – Preview pane of ideal GUI: (a) only e-mail address, (b) e-mail address and name.
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ande-mail addresses. Several controlsabout the certificatesare
performed and PKIX rules are enforced in certificate validation,
but not all of those controls directly affect the e-mail message
that is the actual object to be verified. Regardless of strict
identity check in certificate issuance, names in certificates are
not tied to the e-mailmessages in S/MIME.Theonly connection
between a certificate and an e-mail message is the e-mail
address. That fact enforces the recipients to know their parties
by e-mail addresses, not by names. Moreover, certification
practices of some CAs allow class-1 certificates to include
invalidated names in it. Verifier should examine the certificate
details thoroughly and use his/her judgment, not the e-mail
client program’s, in order not to be deceived in such cases.
S/MIME version 3.0 (Ramsdell, 1999b) does not ensure the
integrity of the e-mail headers. S/MIME version 3.1 (Ramsdell,
2004b) proposes a nonstandard cryptographic header protec-
tion mechanism. However, this is not so easy to adapt in
current e-mail client implementation. Therefore, as of this
writing, none of the e-mail clients implemented header
protection of S/MIME 3.1 in their products. Until header
protection is successfully designed and implemented, it is
preferable not to rely on the header information. Another way
of saying is that the recipient should trust only what is written
in the message body.
There is an important dilemma here. Limitations of
S/MIME require the e-mail users to be more careful and
perform off-line checks while accepting a digitally signed
message. On the other hand, an ordinary user, who does not
have enough information about security and cryptography,
has a tendency to trust what his/her e-mail client says. He/she
prefers automatic controls and easy-to-understand GUIs and
warnings. Some discussions in S/MIME WG show that e-mail
client systems will be able to provide more controls and
easy-to-understand warnings in the future. However, one
should not expect all of those controls as mandatory features
in products with S/MIME support, at least until all potential
interoperability problems among S/MIME, regular e-mail
services, SMTP servers and certification services are identified
and resolved. Indeed, none of the existing e-mail client GUIs
are perfect in the sense that they provide all necessary
controls and relay these controls to the users in a proper way.
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